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Of The Middle States Council For The Social Studies

MILDRED C. STOLER, Editor

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FOREWORD

Since 1903 the Middle States Council for the Social Studies has held meetings in the Middle Atlantic area each year. The Proceedings record in permanent form the scholarly papers presented at these meetings. An examination of the volumes over the years reveals the topics of concern to social studies teachers.

In 1959 the Executive Committee of the Middle States Council for the Social Studies decided that an important topic of current concern to educators in the social studies field was the emergence of nationalism in the former colonial areas of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East after the close of World War II.

Miss Florence Benjamin was the able Program Chairman who organized the series of speeches that appear in this issue of The Proceedings. The meeting was held in Trenton, New Jersey, a city important in the "emerging nationalism" of America in the 1770's.

Only the speeches from the meeting are recorded here. It is impossible to recreate for the reader the generous hospitality of the New Jersey Council for the Social Studies under its President, Miss Maud Austin and the Local Arrangements Chairman, Miss Elisabeth Kelley, or the friendly handshakes and smiles of Governor and Mrs. Robert Meyner who received the group at Morven, or the cheerful chatter of professional friends gathered in reunion from across state boundaries for this meeting.

MURIEL HOOVER
President, Middle States
Council for the Social Studies

MEETING THE LEADERS OF NEW AND EMERGING NATIONS

By Dr. Leonard S. Kenworthy

Brooklyn College, Brooklyn, New York

Maps of the world today become obsolete almost as soon as they are printed, for 25 new nations have been formed since World War II and several more are in the process of formation. This means that approximately 700,000,000 persons are the inhabitants of new countries or one person in every four on our globe.

Recognizing this new wave of nationalism as one of the major trends of our times, I recently spent my sabbatical year visiting the new and emerging nations of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

My primary purpose was to meet the leaders of these newly formed states and to talk with their friends and their critics. Leaders are important everywhere, but they are especially important in the new nations. In fact, it is doubtful if some of these countries would have been formed and would have won their independence so soon had it not been for their leaders. For example, Kwame Nkrumah recently wrote an autobiography entitled Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah. In some parts of the world such a title would be considered blatant conceit. But this is not so in Ghana for nearly everyone agrees that the creation of that country was largely the work of this one man.

One wonders, too, whether Morocco would have won its independence when it did, had it not been for the outstanding leadership of Habib Bourguiba. Similarly, some people doubt if there would have been a country of Pakistan had it not been for the personality of Mohammed Ali Jinnah.

One should not underestimate the importance of the masses in carrying on the struggles for independence in various parts of the world, but without creative leadership these movements would certainly have failed.

On this world tour I took a list of 19 questions which I hoped would evoke clues as to the qualities of these leaders of new nations. The answers to most of these queries were obtained from persons who knew these men intimately, but a few of them came from direct interviews with Nehru, Ben-Gurion, U Nu, Diem, Rahman, Bourguiba, Nkrumah, Mohammed V, and others.

Possibly the most revealing of these questions was "What changes do you hope to see in the next ten years in your country?" Ben-Gurion's reply was the most inclusive and the most specific. It sounded like the outline of a ten-year plan. Starting with millions of trees, he included the establishment of two new ports, the exploitation of the Negev and the Dead Sea, the pumping of water from the Dead Sea, improved transportation, and the development of new sources of revenue. The quickness with which these were enumerated and the urgency revealed in his repeated use of the word "must" were only two of the revelations which came from his reply. Nehru's answer was much less specific and much more philosophical, reflecting his personality and his methods of thinking and working.

A second question which evoked important responses was "What five or six persons have influenced you most?" The King of Morocco dodged this question by saying that there were too many persons to limit the list to five or six -- probably an indication of his fear lest he alienate important persons by failing to mention them. Nehru immediately mentioned his father and Gandhi. Bourguiba referred to his father and his oldest brother, but he also included people from history like Caesar, Napoleon, and Ataturk. He stressed Ataturk as a great reformer in the Moslem world who profoundly changed his country, even though some of the methods he used were not good.

A third question which proved helpful was the query as to what life was like for them when they were 12, 13, or 14 years of age. Perhaps the most interesting reply came from Balewa, the Prime Minister of Nigeria. With a broad smile on his gaunt, black face, he answered, "Life was very interesting and very wonderful then." And he launched into a vivid description of a young lad in northern Nigeria riding ponies, swimming, wrestling, and fighting, adding that life in the country was so much better than life in the city.

Nehru was stumped by this question and hesitated for quite a while before responding, eventually pointing out that he was 14 when his tutor left him and at that point was "at loose ends." The question seemed to remind him of a turning point in his life, and he reminisced about his family and his early education and his preparation at the age of 14 for a new life in England at Harrow.

A fourth query which proved useful was used in most instances to open the interviews with these leaders. It was "What accomplishments are you most proud of in the years since independence?"

Even though Malaya had been independent only a year at the time of my interview with Rahman, he immediately mentioned three accomplishments of which he was most proud. The first was the progress of the war against the guerrilla bands, the second the movement towards better feeling between the Malays, Chinese, and other ethnic groups, and the third the development of economic plans for Malaya.

The fifth question which provoked a good response from everyone was "What suggestions do you have for the education of boys and girls in the United States (or elsewhere) who will probably live to the year 2015 or 2020?"

Probably the most concise answer came from the King of Morocco who replied, "We need a scientific superstructure with a spiritual base and with wings to this educational edifice which stretch out to all parts of the world."

If I had expected these men to be of one type merely because they were leaders of newly formed or emerging nations, that illusion was soon shattered. They have a few traits in common but each is a product of his own country and culture -- or of two countries and cultures in the case of men like Bourguiba, Nehru, and Nkrumah. Each must be viewed against the particular background of his place as well as his time.

With the possible exceptions of Libya and Jordan, each of these men is the leader of a land of promise. Libya may someday become a strong nation, but for the time being it might best be designated as the U. N.

Sandbox for it is woefully underdeveloped in almost every respect. Jordan may also become a strong entity sometime, but at present its economy is not viable, and it is a precarious state composed of one-third refugees, one-third former inhabitants of Palestine whose lands were incorporated into the new Jordan, and one-third citizens of the former country of Trans-Jordan.

As to common characteristics, I was struck repeatedly by the fact that nearly everyone spoke of these leaders as men of integrity and honesty. When one realizes the hazards to honesty in government, especially in lands where access to public funds is new, one can better understand the importance of this quality in leaders.

All, or nearly all, of these men are endowed with tremendous physical energy and drive. Most of them work from 14 to 18 hours a day -- and have done so for years. The fact that they have a real sense of purpose and are in jobs which they relish helps, but the drain on their physical energy is continuous and tremendous. This is especially true of Nehru, who has worked harder and longer than any of the men in this group of leaders unless it be Ben-Gurion.

Almost all of these leaders also have a definite sense of purpose or a single-mindedness of aim. Their passion for independence and their devotion to the creation of new countries is impressive and has made it possible for them to endure hardships and pressures to which ordinary men are seldom exposed. For instance, nearly all of these figures have spent years in prison or exile, with King Idris of Libya, Mohammed V of Morocco, Nehru of India, and Diem of Viet-Nam holding the records in this respect.

Nearly all of these leaders are good speakers. That was almost essential in arousing the people to struggle and fight for independence. Their style of speaking varies from the bombastic oratory of Nkrumah of Ghana or Nyerere of Tanganyika to the quiet, conversational delivery of Nehru, but each has a hold on the people through his speaking ability. Bourguiba is the only one of the leaders of new nations who speaks to his people regularly. Every Friday at noon he speaks to the people of Tunisia over the radio in a North African version of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Fireside Chats."

Most of these men are also lonely persons. The nature of their job probably accounts for this in part, but it may also be that they were lonely children who channelled their energies into leadership and have never attained the art of cultivating close friends. One of the exceptions to this generalization is Rhaman of Malaya, a gregarious type whose finesse in human relations has enabled him to weld together the Malays, Chinese, Indians, Pakistanis, and others in a country torn by minority problems.

Many of these men are poor administrators. They came to power because they were leaders of independence movements and the qualities demanded of them for such leadership are not the same as they need to administer their countries after independence. Some are making the transition from one type of job to the other remarkably well. Others are finding the adjustment difficult. Perhaps Sukarno of Indonesia is one of the obvious examples of a man better adapted to leading an independence movement than to organizing and administering the affairs of a new nation.

Several of these leaders have a real flair for the dramatic. Ben-Gurion has this quality, dramatizing his interest in the settlement of the Negev desert by living there during the short periods of his retirement or going there on his vacations. Bourguiba displays this trait in his ability to pantomime while speaking to large crowds or small groups.

Closely linked with this is the sense of timing of some of these men. Bourguiba probably exemplifies this characteristic best. Without it the independence of Tunisia might have been postponed or never attained. He seemed to sense when to strike, and his timing has been superb.

These leaders vary in their emphasis upon speed in attaining their objectives, with the men trained in the United States the most insistent on rapid change. Thus Nkrumah said to me when I asked him if I should come back in 10 years or wait for 15 years in order to see great changes, "Don't wait 15 years. Don't wait 10 years. Come back in 5 years, and we will have plenty to show you."

But nearly all of them know that they are racing

against time. Their people are a part of the revolution of rising expectations and are demanding results -- now. As Diem of Viet-Nam said, "Asian leaders are not permitted the luxury of plenty of time to study problems, debate about or carry on experiments to find the best solutions. They will not be able to work out the evolutionary solutions as American leaders could in the past. Time is a luxury which Asian peoples cannot afford."

All of them are proud of their past and determined to preserve the best parts of their culture as they try to bring about changes. Typical of their feelings on this subject was the comment of U Nu of Burma. Sitting one Sunday afternoon on the porch of a teachers college in Moulmein, he said, "We had a great and flourishing civilization in Burma at the time when William the Conqueror was crossing the English Channel. We do not claim that our way of life is better than that of other people. We merely say that it is different, that it suits us better, and that we cannot be induced to give it up in exchange for some other way of life -- be that the Communist Way, the Western European Way, the American Way, or any other Way."

Intensely interested in how these men developed into leaders, I probed as much as I could with the men themselves and supplemented my findings by interviews with many other persons.

Several of these leaders had been sensitive, introspective, bookish children. In most cases there was an obvious explanation. For example, Ben-Gurion's mother died when he was ten, and he belonged to an oppressed minority in the little town of Plonsk, Poland. In the case of Bourguiba, he was the last child in the family, born seven years after the others. His father was already an old man when Habib was born. His mother also died when he was ten, and he was reared largely by his older brother and his brother's wife. Nehru led a very sheltered life as the only son in a rich family and with only one sister as a playmate, that sister being several years younger than he. Most of the men who rose as common leaders of the people seem to have been of this type.

On the other hand, the men who came to power as a result of being members of a royal family were generally "hell raisers" as boys. This is true of Mohammed V, Hussein of Jordan, and the Prince of Cambodia. In the cases of Hussein and Mohammed V there was no reason to think that they would be rulers at all or at least for many years. Hussein came to power very early in his life because of the assassination of his grandfather and the mental illness of his father. Mohammed V was selected instead of older brothers because the French thought that he would be more pliable.

The heavy responsibilities of office have sobered them greatly, however. This is especially true of Hussein who has lived through more tragedy than any of the leaders of new nations and has learned to live above such disasters.

U Nu is an example of a boy with a poor start who later made good. At the age of twelve he was banished from his home for drunkenness, but later he was able to conquer this habit and rise to great heights as a religious as well as political leader in Burma.

Because of the nature of the societies in which they have lived, most of these men seem to have been influenced more by their fathers than by their mothers. Nehru's father, for example, was an outstanding person. He was a Brahmin from Kashmir, a banker, and a member of a prominent family. Nehru says, "I admired father tremendously. He seemed to me the embodiment of strength and courage and cleverness, far above all the other men I saw ...." Diem's father was a tutor in the royal palace in Viet-Nam and a leader in political movements there. Ben-Gurion's father was a leading Zionist in Poland in whose home political leaders of his day gathered.

In only one case did one of these leaders stress the influence of his mother and that was Rahman, who emphasized the fact that his mother was half Burmese and half Siamese. Others said that some of his interest in minority groups in Malaya came from this background.

For several of these leaders, their education abroad was a potent influence. It helped to broaden their background and give them rich experiences on which to draw as leaders. And it has aided them with their followers who respect them for their educational attainments and their foreign experiences. Nehru's years in England, Nkrumah's years in the United States, and Bourguiba's years in France were extremely important to them and to the development of independence movements in their countries. To a lesser extent this could be said about some of the others.

It is interesting and important to know how the idea of independence was planted in the minds of these men. With some it came through reading about earlier independence movements; with others primarily through personal contact with leaders of such groups. Reference has already been made to the fact that Bourguiba was tremendously impressed as a child with the story of Ataturk. Nehru was early associated with Gandhi and the non-violent resistance movement in India. Jinnah of Pakistan was moulded in part by the great Indian leader Gokhale.

Mboya of Kenya and Nyerere of Tanganyika both mentioned to me the American revolution and the fight for independence in the Gold Coast under Nkrumah.

Nkrumah was affected most by the great African educator, James K. Aggrey, vice-principal of Achimoto College near Accra and also by Azikiwe, the present Premier of Eastern Nigeria.

The thinking of Ben-Gurion and Bourguiba has been influenced profoundly by philosophers and writers. Ben-Gurion said that the Bible, several Hebrew and Russian writers, Plato, and Thucydides had influenced him, but he added that the "rough, rugged life in Palestine as a young man" had been the most influential factor in his thinking.

Bourguiba has long been an ardent admirer of the French philosophers and is able to quote them at length. The King of Morocco said that the Koran had been the greatest single influence in his life. Diem of Viet-Nam is another of the men with a strong philosophical bent of mind.

None of these men has rejected the religion of his childhood or of his culture, but many of them would fit more easily into the pattern of humanists than of strong believers in Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, or Christianity. Thus Nehru is culturally a Hindu but primarily a humanist. Nkrumah calls himself a "non-denominational Christian and a Marxist socialist." Although he is steeped in Jewish history and folklore and is an authority on the Bible, Ben-Gurion is not an orthodox Jew, a fact which causes considerable dismay to certain groups in Israel.

U Nu is probably the one man in the group whose interest in organized religion is outstanding. He has taken an active role in the renaissance of Buddhism and primarily for personal rather than political reasons. The King of Morocco is the head of the Moslems in his country but is not a great authority on Islam. Diem presents the interesting figure of a Catholic president of a Buddhist country ---- with two of his chief advisers American Jews of Russian background.

To what extent these men have risen to positions of power and prestige because of their physical appearance is a problem worthy of further investigation by persons better qualified to comment on this than I am. Dr. Chester Hunt, for example, has written about Magsaysay of the Philippines that "Physically he is perfectly cast for the Filipino version of the father image. He has the light brown skin and broad facial features which distinguish the comparatively pure-blooded Filipino from the mestizo, but his size and height make him tower above most of his countrymen. Thus, he is more like them than politicians of strong mestizo background ---- and at the same time he has the build which Filipinos associate with Westerners. To the peasant, he is one who looks like themselves -- only bigger and stronger ...."

Space does not permit a lengthy discussion of the problems which each of these men is facing or has faced, but it may be worthwhile merely to mention the outstanding problems of new nations. A few of these apply only to some of the countries, but most of them apply to all of these new and emerging nations. These include the problem of internal security, better transportation, federalism versus regionalism, language, health, education, agriculture, capital for improvements, industrialization, unity, social erosion, and foreign relations.

All of these men who are leaders of new and emerging nations are not great men, but several of them will undoubtedly go down in history as outstanding figures in this period. The road to the top has been rough and long, and only men of patience, persistence, and purpose have survived in most of these new nations. Also, there seems to be a curious release of energy in a new country and these men have become bigger because of the demands put on them.

These men are the leaders of new nationalisms, anxious to polevault into the international community of our day, but anxious to retain much that is good in their own cultures. Otherwise they could not be the leaders which time has proved them to be.

AMERICA'S REACTION TO EMERGING NATIONALISMS

By Dr. Eric F. Goldman

America's attitude toward the nationalistic ambitions of other peoples has passed through three distinguishable phases, first, a good deal of sympathy with emerging nationalisms, then active encouragement, and finally considerable resistance.

The United States was born in the course of its own revolutionary nationalism and early developed a tradition of sympathizing with countries in the throes of a similar fervor. In practice this meant sympathy for European nationalisms because, so far as most Americans of the nineteenth century were concerned, nothing or next to nothing was happening in Asia and Africa. In the years around 1848, a high point in European yearnings for nationhood, we invited to America a number of leaders and bestowed upon them various laurels, often the laurel of permitting them to address Congress. The Hungarian, Kossuth, is perhaps the best known of these figures.

It should be noted that in this phase the United States was reacting favorably to a decidedly middle class nationalism. Such nationalism sought primarily to separate one people from the rule of another and, so far as economic and political change was concerned, stood only for the type of alteration which the American people could readily understand and approve. In the nineteenth century, an America deeply influenced by middle-class values was patting on the head European movements which were bustling toward the same values.

In the twentieth century, we moved into a second phase; we not only sympathized with such nationalism but often vigorously encouraged it and showed a desire to stir it up around the world. In this phase the most significant figure certainly was Woodrow Wilson, who to this day is a symbol of nationalism to many of the peoples of the world. Wilson is a curious figure in American history -- a very much loved and a very much hated figure. There are many reasons for this, but one of the most important is that he invested everything he did with enormous moral fervor. As President of

Princeton, if he wanted to fire an instructor, he found some tremendously moral reason for doing it. As President of the United States, if he was for or against a postmaster's appointment the reason was equally lofty. People who had the same moral wave length were ecstatic; unbelievers were likely to be sarcastic, bitter.

Wilson's ideas about nationalism were completely entangled with moral values. It is impossible to read his speeches and letters without drawing the conclusion that to him nationalism had become a matter of faith, attached to his rigid Presbyteranism as surely as was his opposition to carnal sin. When he decided to take the United States into World War I, he found among the basic reasons for doing so a conviction that the war would bring about a situation congenial to the triumph of nationalism. Exalted by this idea, he developed the famous or notorious principle of national self-determination, which he made one of the "Fourteen Points" on which the peace was to be based.

Wilson never stated clearly just why he wanted national self-determination so much. There are historians, among them myself, who wish that he had stopped and thought about it before he proclaimed to the world that the making of nations, in and of itself, is a good thing, that somehow the world is better off when it has eighty rather than forty nations. So far as Wilson was concerned, there were no such questions. There was something intrinsically, something morally good in a people having a state of its own.

Historians have also pondered exactly what Wilson meant by national self-determination but we do not need to be detained long by this discussion. Its importance was in what people thought it meant and what it was taken to mean -- and now not only in Europe but in Asia and Africa -- was that each language-nationality group should have its own government. This doctrine of national self-determination came at a time when, regardless of America's role in the world, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa were astir. What Wilson did was to stoke these movements, to give them hope and a sense of greater urgency. By the time Wilson arrived for the Versailles Peace Conference he was beset by representatives of scores of little groups around the world, each of which wanted its own independent state.

Some of these groups were genuinely significant, for example, the people who would soon create an independent Czechoslovakia. Some were simply pathetic, like the scattered tribesmen from Africa. However, most of the men besieging Wilson spoke for groups which in recent decades have actually achieved national self-determination.

In the post-Wilson years, the United States gradually moved into a third phase of reaction to nationalisms. There were inklings of the new attitude in the 1920's and 1930's but only inklings. The attitude really emerged in important form only after World War II. By the later 1940's, the United States, which had so long moved with nationalism, now turned against it to a significant degree. By the late 1940's, the yearnings for nationhood around the world were often associated with demands for profoundly anti-middle class social change -- the kind which Americans little understood and with which they decidedly did not sympathize. Of still greater importance, many of the nationalist movements were pro-Communist or might become pro-Communist or looked admiringly to the Soviet Union. All of this was happening when it was becoming only too plain that world-wide Communism was a direct threat to the security of the United States.

As our sympathies with the new nationalisms slid away, historians began to notice an essential fact. There is a great dividing line in American history, a dividing line which falls vaguely in the decade of the 1940's. For almost two hundred years the American people had really been wrestling with one question: Should there be extremes of wealth and status in the United States? This was a basic issue in Jefferson's period, in Jackson's period, in all periods, and particularly in the fifty years that opened in the 1890's.

Americans divided into camps over the issue -- the conservative and the liberal camp. We fought bitterly about it and the futures of great political parties rose and fell in terms of their answers to it. Then, in the late 1940's, the question ceased to have any great meaning for a simple reason: the answer had been provided by social and economic developments. To a large extent, American society, in its own bewildering way, had done away with extremes of wealth and status.

Historians began to see that all the while Americans wrangled over a domestic issue we had been generally agreeing on an assumption concerning foreign affairs. The business of the United States was the United States. There was a world outside which was largely incomprehensible and, to the extent that one did understand it, rather repellent and dangerous. Once in a while it was necessary to interfere in that world because parts of it persisted in going berserk in a way that endangered us, but then we interfered in a quick, final way. We got it over with. We engaged in diplomacy, or war if necessary -- and then hurried back to the main American concern. A foreign policy was something that you had, like measles, and got over with as quickly as possible.

We Americans were the more inclined to believe in the quick final solution to any world problem because we really did not believe that the world was any great problem after all. Implicit in our attitude was an assumption so strong that it took on the cast of a law of history. All the peoples in the world, the law ran, want peace and democracy, middle-class democracy like ours; they all want to move up in status gradually the way Americans have done -- gradually and with due regard for the amenities. Once in a while leaders come along who depart from this pattern, leaders such as the Nazi figures or the men in the Kremlin. The assumption was that people will naturally fall back into the pattern of seeking middle-class democracy once such leaders have been removed.

This attitude is deeply implanted in our history. Have you noticed that we have never fought a war in the name of fighting a whole people? We never say that a country is wrong. What we say is simply that there are certain evil leaders who must be removed from the scene. At the present moment, for example, many important American political figures insist on policies which directly imply that the Chinese people want democracy and that, if we got rid of their Communist leaders, the Chinese people would naturally swing to democracy; that, if we got rid of Communist control in Russia, the Russian people would establish democracy, and so on.

Most of the new nationalisms emerging after World War II were an obvious -- and frightening -- variation from the alleged "law of history." Around the globe

millions of men and women, far from gradually moving toward middle-class views, were hurtling off in an entirely different direction, looking admiringly toward the Soviet Union, developing their own heresies, united by nothing so much as feeling that they did not want to remake themselves in the American image.

Our reaction, naturally enough, was fear and indignation. India is an important example of the new attitude. During the nineteenth century, India called up a great deal of sympathy in America. How many thousands of times did church people in America send food and clothing to India -- and how many times did American politicians thunder that India should be free! As India neared nationhood in the twentieth century, we were entirely sure that a free India was going to be sensible and come out a strong friend of America. As late as 1947 the President of the United States was saying that the Indians were "natural" friends of America.

It was therefore with consternation and anger that we discovered that Prime Minister Nehru, the leader of independent India, was not a natural friend of the United States and that the Indian people as a whole seemed to have no natural feelings of friendship for America. We found that they, like all nations before them, were acting on the basis of national self-interest. Their government felt it was to their national self-interest not to align India with either side in the Cold War and that was their policy -- whether America liked it or not.

About a year ago I had the intensely interesting experience of visiting India and I was struck, above all, by the difference between the Indian and American view of their new-found independence. I kept reading American newspapers which, in one way or another, were saying that the Indians had not conducted the right kind of a nationalistic revolution. It should have been a middle-class revolution and should have confined itself to political issues. Instead it was social and economic as well as political -- a social and economic revolution that did not particularly admire America and was constantly in danger of sliding over into pro-Sovietism.

On their part, the Indians kept expressing to me their feeling that we were "hypocrites." Had the

United States not started with its own nationalistic revolution? Had we not once sympathized with Italian, Hungarian, and other nationalistic revolutions of the nineteenth century? Then how could we pretend to be consistent, considering our attitude toward what India was doing?

So there have been three fairly distinguishable stages in America's reaction to nationalisms. Will we enter a fourth stage fairly soon and if so, what will it be? A fourth stage, I suppose, is already here, at least in part. It is implicit in some of our policies under both President Truman and President Eisenhower, and outspoken in the thinking of influential figures like George Kennan.

This new view holds that we should actively sympathize with a number of the new nationalistic movements -- including ones that call for drastic social and economic change. The line would be drawn against those new nations which are pawns of Soviet foreign policy or very clearly seem headed in that direction. Under such a policy, the nationalism of free India, for example, would receive hearty American sympathy.

Some commentators have begun to call the group which argues for this policy "the Reconcilables" -- i. e., they are reconciled to a decidedly different world and, from the point of view of traditional American ideas, a decidedly unpleasant world. The Reconcilables are an interesting group; they do not fit into any of the neat social, economic, or political categories to which we are accustomed. Among the leading Reconcilables, for example, are George Kennan, who is quite conservative in domestic affairs, and the ardent New Dealer, Fair Dealer, Chester Bowles.

But will the Reconcilables win over American public opinion, or enough of it to put any significant part of their program into effect? That question certainly cannot be answered at the present time. As a matter of fact, the issue raised by the Reconcilables is likely to be the chief political battle ground in the United States during the next decade, replacing the old issue of "Should we have great extremes of wealth and status?"

EMERGING NATIONALISMS

THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

By Dr. Frances R. Fussell

Lecturer on International Affairs, Swarthmore, Pa.

The theme of this Conference is "Emerging Nationalisms." Appropriate emphases for it against the backdrop of the East-West ideological competition are (a) the hopes of the Free World, (b) the targets of Communism, and (c) the native aspirations for technology. Any emerging nationalism in the mid-twentieth century strives for independence and industrialization. Needless to say the East-West pitch for the loyalty of each emerging nationalism is competitively high. Primary targets for East-West efforts today are Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Secondary targets are Latin-America and India. In short, it is the United States and Europe versus the Soviet Union and Red China in the global struggle for the allegiances of the emerging and newly emerged nationalisms the world around.

Soviet challenges to nationalisms at all stages stem, of course, from its now well-known global domination intent, and they encompass military, economic, political, and propaganda objectives. The assessment of the Free World at the moment is that the Soviet Union recognizes the military stalemate and is militarily deterred, but that it is stepping up compensatorily the other three challenges. These may yet become as formidable as the military threat has been at such time as the Soviet Union exports in volume its management skills and development capital to the emerging nationalisms on such easy terms that the private capitalism of the Free World will find it difficult to compete. Once the Soviet Union has successfully planted its managerial skills and its development capital in these areas, it can easily follow through with the political subversion technique. So it has now become of the utmost importance to the Free World to find a new collective foreign aid vehicle in such strength that the emerging nationalisms can become viable enough, in time enough, to resist the web of Soviet subversion.

The State Department tells us that Africa is divided into three parts -- the Mediterranean littoral north of the Sahara (Arab North Africa); white-dominated black Africa on the East Coast from Kenya to the Union of South Africa; and Black Africa proper, chiefly West and Central Africa. Each of these regions has its touchstone indicating vulnerabilities and threats to peace. For example, the touchstone for Arab Africa is "the turbaned rebel guerrilla," that for East Africa is (or perhaps was) the "Mau Mau," and for Black Africa "the witch doctor." These are the images indicating the stage of political development that must be improved with the help of the Free World, lest these regions become easy prey for Communism's world domination endeavor.

Mr. Hammarskjold, Secretary-General of the United Nations, says that in the next decade the world's attention will be mainly focused on the continent of Africa because of its emerging nationalisms and the problems that they create. Indeed, the 13th session of the General Assembly has been called the "African Session." Prior to this time the United Nations has been most consistently concerned with the Middle East as a perennial trouble spot. Now its focus has shifted to Africa.

In his Inside Africa John Gunther speaks of this continent as a "mass of exploding yeast" in every field -- religious, economic, social, educational, political. Heretofore, Africa has been outside the cultural stream of western civilization, except, of course, for the contribution of the early Egyptian civilization. The reason for this has been that the continent has few good harbors and few rivers that can be penetrated very far into the interior. The northern part is sealed off by desert, mountain ranges, and the Nile cataracts. The equatorial region has been plagued by insects. Large areas have been both inaccessible and uninhabitable for the white man. Nevertheless, four European colonizing powers -- Britain, France, Belgium, and Portugal -- did succeed in harnessing the manpower and the resources of this continent for the benefit of the trading world until the middle of the 20th century.

Now, of course, colonial bonds are being torn asunder, if not willingly given up. Only a few years ago there were but three independent states -- Egypt, Ethiopia, and Liberia -- and some sixty territories held

by four European Powers. In 1960, however, over half the population of Africa will be self-governing despite the handicaps of "the turbaned, rebel guerrilla," "the Mau Mau," and "the witch doctor."

Each of the colonial powers exercised control differently. For example, Britain held the political reins reasonably loosely but held the economic strings quite tightly in her "sterling bloc." France, on the other hand, allowed the economic strings to be quite loose, but pulled the political strings taut. Obviously the British strategy proved to be the more successful because today her empire is very nearly intact under the Commonwealth insignia while France has been gradually losing her empire after costly wars to hold it.

Apart from the three-fold division of Africa already mentioned, there has been another kind of division at the tenth parallel. To the north lies the Mohammedan world and to the south lies the black and very nearly pagan world. Symbolically though, two hands stretch across the Sahara today, Mr. Nasser's and Mr. Nkrumah's, in an effort to consolidate the interests of native white and black Africans. Both are exploring the possibilities of future coexistence. Mr. Nkrumah has ideas of confederation for black Africa; Mr. Nasser envisions a Pan-Arab Union, though the Arabs of North Africa consider themselves very different from the Arabs of the Middle East. But both leaders agree that there should be a "Monroe Doctrine" for Africa -- that Africa should be for native Africans only and not for colonial bred Africans or for foreign interests.

While there is an apparent reconciliation of the native whites and blacks on either side of the Sahara Desert, elsewhere in Africa, the black man seems only too anxious to oust the colonial white man at the earliest possible time. A formidable obstacle to this is to be found in the Union of South Africa's insistence upon a segregation policy known as apartheid -- a policy thoroughly condemned by the International Court of Justice, by the Trusteeship Council, and by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Africa's greatest resource is manpower. Her needs involve managerial skills and development capital for her rich natural resources and her vast manpower pool. This continent in the next decade represents the hopes

of the Free World, the target of Communism, and the native aspirations for technology. It is not that Africa is changing, for all of the world is changing -- but it is the rate at which it is changing that is so significant. No emerging nationalisms anywhere have had quite the speed and the momentum of those in Africa, with all that that involves for the rest of the world.

While there are no emerging nationalisms in Europe, this area is characterized by a division of established nationalisms along the Iron Curtain and by an effort at federation of the established nationalisms on both sides of that Curtain.

With respect to Western Europe, the United States sees its ultimate strength in a United States of Europe. Evolutionary aids in this direction have been the Marshall Plan, NATO, the European Common Market, the Coal and Steel Community, and the Euratom Project. The respective nationalisms, however, present a strong counter-pull to federation. France, for instance, has a difficult time adjusting her national psychology away from the concept of a Great Power in her own right to that of a reasonably small state in a large federation.

The Soviet objective is to consolidate control over Eastern Europe, obtain the Free World's recognition of this fait accompli, force the West from Berlin, and achieve the withdrawal of Western armed might from Europe -- presumably to ease the Soviet task of taking it over. To the extent that there is a European touchstone at the moment, it is perhaps best characterized by the single word "Berlin."

The concept of emerging nationalisms in the Middle East is summed up for most people in the Arab-Israeli dispute touchstone. Practically every session of the Security Council since the creation of the United Nations has dealt in one way or another with this issue and recently the General Assembly has also. The United Nations created Israel, but Arab nations have refused to recognize its existence. The Arabs led an unsuccessful war -- to them as yet unfinished -- against Israel, and the latter fought back successfully. The net conclusion of the United Nations agencies that have dealt with this issue has been that, with the exception of the attack on Suez where Israel, Britain, and France were declared "aggressors," the Arabs have been the initia-

tors of attacks in the Middle East, but the Israelis are equally blameworthy for using excessive retaliation.

Many experts in the field hope that eventually the fifty-six million Arabs in the Middle East who are now so divided, disorganized, and widely dispersed -- without common leadership or indeed common cultural backgrounds -- will one day come to feel secure under a leader committed to Free World values. With the security that comes from the organized weight of numbers, it is thought that the old Arab aggression stemming from the inferiority of disorganization will melt away, and that the Arabs will then be willing to recognize the existence of a mere two million Israelis and to work in peace with them on much needed irrigation projects and the like. This may be a far-fetched dream, but it also bears the stamp of plausibility.

Even if there were no Israel in the Middle East, there would still be the problem of the economic, political, and social revolution of the Arab masses that is taking place. The United States is of course committed to the existence of Israel. The Soviet Union is committed to the support of the Arab World's opposition to Israel. The East-West controversy is thus superimposed on the Arab-Israeli controversy, and both are superimposed on the 20th century economic and social revolutions sweeping the Middle East along with other developing peoples of the world.

For these reasons the Middle East is the major propaganda battlefield of the world today. The Voice of America, Radio Moscow, and Radio Cairo flood the coffee houses where the men tend to congregate and where radio has its greatest impact. However, as radio becomes a part of the equipment of the peasants and even of the Arab caravans in the desert, the influence of the coffee house will undoubtedly decline. But for now the Arab-Israeli dispute and the Arab coffee house are the touchstones of vulnerabilities in the Middle East.

"The village" is the touchstone of life in all of Asia since this is the basic underpinning for the newly established nationalisms. In India it is the grass-roots growth of democracy at the village level that is so significant. In Red China it is the coercion of the village commune that has caused the most trouble. And

in Southeast Asia it is the various ethnic cultures of the village people that are the targets to be influenced.

Because India's "non-involvement" in the East-West struggle is puzzling to Americans, who do not understand a neutral position in a conflict of right with wrong, our State Department is urging us to become better acquainted with Indian culture as an offset to our doubts about her aloofness. For instance, we can in fact understand Indian music far better than we can understand the music of any other Asiatic people. Indian architecture has religious symbolism and this evokes our sympathetic response. Indians invented the zero symbol, so basic to our mathematical sciences. Indian literature is being brought to our attention increasingly by UNESCO. All these are bonds with the Free World, India's votes with the Soviet Union in the United Nations to the contrary notwithstanding, as is also India's trade, the bulk of which is with the United Kingdom and the United States.

India, as a newly established nationalism, still walks a "non-involvement" tight-rope in the East-West controversy while she endeavors to secure her leadership of the Asiatic peoples over Red China's competition for this leadership, and while she still hopes to persuade Kashmir to throw in her lot with India rather than with Pakistan.

In Southeast Asia the respective nationalisms did emerge after World War II in the form of modern states, but their ethnic and cultural backgrounds, not at all common to each other, are still rooted deep in the past rather than being oriented to the forward promise of their national potentials. The tie that binds these emerged nationalisms together is their anti-colonial memories.

Southeast Asia is not a closely integrated region. Indeed there is scarcely communication or transportation across their borders because the means are virtually nonexistent. Yet, because it is an area of competitive interest between the East and the West, it is often represented as more of an integrated geographical region than it actually is.

The "touchstone" of vulnerabilities here is the "burned, thatched hut." Here where people have rarely lived beyond the age of thirty-four, death is a major

source of superstition. When death strikes, the natives move out of the hut and burn it.

Now that the Free World has brought the Medical Revolution to Southeast Asia, some part of these old vulnerabilities will probably decline. But even in this major rice bowl of the world, people, because of their feudal society, are often hungry from the time they are born until they die. So the Medical Revolution alone is not quite enough.

The Free World therefore has tried to bring the Economic Revolution in the wake of the Medical, to improve the living standard of the people, and to remove their political frustrations by helping them to have the wherewithal to govern themselves. For example, the Free World, acting through the United Nations, is embarking upon the Mekong River Project. The great Mekong River rises in Tibet and flows unharnessed for twenty-seven hundred miles bringing great floods and much devastation in its wake. Once this river is harnessed for flood control, irrigation, and power projects, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam will be major beneficiaries of a very necessary, long overdue Economic Revolution in the freedom pattern.

The Soviet technique to influence the people of this region has been to inflate the egos of each ethnic minority by promises to improve its psychological status above all others. These ethnic approaches have carried great weight. It remains to be seen whether the lifting of physical frustrations or psychological frustrations will have the greater influence.

Red China's emerged nationalism appears to have for its international objectives (a) to aid and abet Communism's world-domination effort; (b) to wrest the leadership of the Asiatic World from India; (c) to create in the next fifteen years an economy equivalent to that of the United Kingdom -- for international competitive purposes; (d) to control Quemoy, Matsu, Taiwan, and other offshore islands; and (e) to gain admission to the United Nations. Nationalisms of this kind are of course major problems for the Free World.

In conclusion then, the emerging nationalisms represent the hopes of the Free World, the targets of

Communism, and the native aspirations for technology. All of them need management skills and development capital -- which can be provided by either of the major competing ideological systems.

These emerging nationalisms have their respective vulnerabilities on which the East-West ideological competition plays. They also have their respective ethnic and cultural roots which tend to require some measure of accommodation on the part of the competing ideologies.

The Free World's "ace in the hole" is the knowledge that the values for which it stands represent the aspirations of all of mankind since time began and the certainty that its living institutions truly validate these long-held hopes.

DEVELOPING WORLD UNDERSTANDING IN THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL CLASSROOM

By Evelyn R. Gerardin

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The congruence of "world understanding" and "elementary school" may, at first glance, seem fatuous in the extreme. Not too long ago it was assumed that young children should concern themselves with the study of societies that were reputed to be simple in structure and in form or with cultural groups who made a colorful and dramatic appeal. In practice, many misconceptions were developed by children since cultural groups remote in time and space proved to be deceptively simple in form, and some favorite customs and practices of the Dutch people, Japanese, and other groups were, in actuality, displayed mainly for the benefit of tourists.

Teachers who respect the integrity of children and who are sincerely interested in their intellectual development have a firm belief that information acquired by children should be accurate; this concept of reality makes it impossible to teach with sincerity some of the topics that were so popular in the elementary grades a relatively short time ago.

Admittedly, world understanding has many facets which are not within the scope of elementary school children. Indeed, it is conceivable that many adults who are in process of expanding and refining their own concepts find new reasons for re-examination each day.

It is, however, quite possible to develop with children understandings that are appropriate to their maturity level and that provide a substantial base for further elaboration at subsequent educational levels. It is essential, however, for the teacher to have clearly in mind the concepts that he seeks to develop with his children and to face realistically his own doubts and confusions concerning them.

Once this theoretical base has been established, he must then become inventive and perceptive in utilizing

experiences which will help children to develop understandings so that these children can function intelligently in their world.

The following selection of concepts and activities is not meant to be in any sense a thorough going analysis or a basis for development of total curriculum experiences. The selection has been made simply in terms of observations of children as they progress in world understanding in an elementary school.

The learning atmosphere in the classroom is important. In Teaching World Understanding, Preston[1] calls attention to the need for a classroom which engenders a spirit of open-minded inquiry in all matters. In such an atmosphere, he feels, young people are encouraged to discover facts for themselves.

Foreign visitors to the school serve an invaluable function when children are permitted to ask them questions about their countries, their schools, their customs, and other topics of interest to young children. Parents who have lived in other parts of the world are frequently willing to visit the class and answer questions posed by the children.

Children who have such experiences show definite growth in skill in asking sincere questions that reflect respect for differences in people and a search for information. The genuine quality of these questions is sharply differentiated from the stereotyped, patterned questions that are duly recorded on a chart at the outset of a unit of study.

Quite recently, children who attend the Greek Orthodox Church celebrated Easter. In a school where children enjoy the respect and friendly feelings of their classmates they seem quite willing to answer such questions as, "Why does your Easter come later than ours?" The children who had answers discussed the differences in the calendars. They also described some of the religious ceremonies as they are practiced in villages and cities in Greece and then told about the

[1]Ralph C. Preston, ed., Teaching World Understanding (N. Y., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955), 3.

adaptations made in celebrations in this country.

In a classroom climate where sincere inquiry is encouraged, children achieve prestige and status when they can contribute such information. Thus, little by little, children learn that each of us is enriched and hence strengthened by the contribution of others with whom we live.

Knowledge of our own country and pride in it is part of world understanding. It is a red letter day when one of the fifth grade boys becomes a naturalized citizen of the United States. A celebration is planned in his honor since the event is a milestone in his life. His parents participate in the festivities which have great significance for the entire family.

Children in this class gain a new awareness of the heritage into which they were born as they realize how fervently it has been desired by one of their group. They study the responsibilities of citizenship and achieve new insights and new perspectives.

The insular complaint that attention to world understanding may detract from national pride seems groundless when the facts are examined from the vantage point of experience with elementary school children. Certainly, children have no less national pride when they study the contribution of Americans of many national origins to their country's growth.

Kenworthy[2] points to the importance of developing with children an understanding that we live in a world with different kinds of people. An appreciation of the contributions of many cultural groups to our country's growth may well be a beginning of stretching the boundaries of understanding. Children who study essential occupations in the United States learn to appreciate ethnic groups who brought skills in agriculture and in industry and thereby fostered our growth and development.

Some children who have studied the westward expansion and growth of the United States have reached the

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[2]Leonard Kenworthy, "Studying Other Countries and Peoples in the Elementary School," ibid., 17-41.

erroneous conclusion that all of the really thrilling national challenges have been met and that the exciting adventures are a thing of the past. Others have spent time profitably in reference work and in discussion of unmet needs in medicine, industry, housing, soil conservation, and numerous other areas.

It is to be hoped that social studies taught at its best will instill not only pride in our country, but a desire to improve it.

People are affected by ways of living and thinking within their culture. Robert Gibson[3] reminds us of the work of cultural anthropologists who advanced the idea that "cultures are organic patterns to be treated as living wholes." He emphasizes the need to understand people and their way of life within a cultural context.

Acceptance of this approach means that teachers are concerned with helping children to understand any group of people in terms of their environment and of their cultural patterns. Understanding should not be confused with approval since the two are not synonymous. However, it is necessary to interpret particular aspects of the life of a people in terms of the total pattern.

A sixth grade class made progress toward this goal through a study of contrasts in food consumed around the world. Children made trips to market stalls and to small shops which specialized in food imported from China, Norway, Switzerland, and Spain. Some of these foods were strange to the children in appearance, texture, and taste. They found it difficult to understand why anyone would voluntarily eat dried squid, tare root, goat milk cheese, and dried beans.

The answer to this question involved a study of physical features such as location, climate, soil, arable land, and a recognition that tastes are cultivated for various kinds of food. To the children, foreign foods became not an object of ridicule and derision, but part of a way of life, an understandable and reasonable way appropriate to a particular ethnic group. Thus, beginnings are made in understanding nationality groups

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[3]Robert E. Gibson, "A Program of Cross-Cultural Education," Educational Leadership, XVI, No. 7, April, 1959, 409-414.

in a cultural context.

Nations and people depend upon each other. Communication is essential among nations. The concept of interdependence among nations is one that needs to be emphasized throughout the elementary school. The alert teacher finds countless opportunities to do this through a variety of curriculum experiences.

A fifth grade was interested in problems of soil conservation in the local area. Conversation with a specialist in soil conservation served to sharpen inquiry, and a field trip provided some answers but posed other questions. Finally, interest was aroused in problems of conservation and food supply in the Far East as well as in other parts of the world.

Such expansion of interest made it possible to introduce the children to one of the specialized agencies of the United Nations, namely, the FAO. Through study, use of many resources, and discussion, the children began to understand the reality of the need for technicial assistance to the nations of the world so they might be fed.

The omnipresence of the threat of insufficient food and of inadequate diet helped to explain some of the ways of life in foreign countries. The need for international cooperation to solve some of these problems was seen as essential, and the work of a few of the agencies set up for this purpose came to be understood in part and valued.

Communication can be effected in ways other than through speech or writing. Recently, an exhibit of water colors done by Japanese children proved to be more effective as a means of communication than whole paragraphs. These pictures were exhibited in an elementary school, and children could be observed daily examining the prints and commenting with amazement on the high degree of skill evidenced in the brush work.

The elementary school has many opportunities to emphasize world understandings. Teachers who are aware of the basic concepts they seek to develop are quick to see and to use teaching and learning opportunities as

they arise. Many classroom experiences are carefully planned so that continuous experiences are provided by children. Other opportunities arise as the year progresses and can be valuable curriculum material for the teacher who is sensitive to his responsibility for guiding children toward achievement of world understandings.

Whenever children are learning to report facts accurately, to respect the views of others, to postpone judgment until data have been collected, and to evaluate what they have heard or read in terms of its accuracy, they are learning valuable skills which will be useful in trying to understand people and problems of other countries. It is to be hoped that good teaching in the elementary school will make it possible for children to achieve world understandings that will enable them to live successfully in a world of many different peoples.

NATIONALISM: ISSUES AND PROBLEMS ON THE SECONDARY LEVEL

By Dr. David E. Weingast

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There was a time, not so many years ago, when nationalism was a tidy little subject to teach. Its limits were clear. Examples to prove the conventional theses were conveniently at hand. The teacher could feel, when he had finished teaching the subject, that some eternal verities had been examined and confirmed. Then he could comfortably re-tie the package labeled "nationalism" and put it away for another semester or another year.

But that pleasant exercise, like so many others, is gone, perhaps forever. Hardly any subject in the social studies program today is more full of uncertainty, of paradox, and of explosive ingredients than nationalism.

We have come to see that a movement, once believed to be a force for good, also carries a surprising potential for evil; that nationalism, once considered an instrument for liberating enthralled peoples, might also precipitate bankruptcy, hunger, and war. That same devil who is adept at quoting Scripture has also learned the uses of nationalism.

Every teacher of history knows the broad outlines, at least, of the story of nationalism. It emerged, generally speaking, during the late Middle Ages, as various princes brought lesser nobles under control and in turn defied the monarch or emperor.

This dual movement of combining feudal properties on one hand, and reducing the imperial power on the other, contributed to the fashioning of modern nations. Though this telescopes several centuries of history, it approximates what happened.

The early nationalism, the nationalism that developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had certain important qualities that must be remembered today. One basic assumption was that nationalism meant

freedom from foreign control. The nation was to be sovereign. It was no longer to be under the rule or dictation of any other power. There was another important assumption, appropriate to a time of soaring idealism: the individual inside the nation was himself free. He had rights that were sacred and inviolate.

Another implication was that under nationalism it would be possible, ultimately, to unite all men in some kind of universal brotherhood. Nationalism, as originally conceived, had bright possibilities for elevating the human condition.

Many things helped to forge the nations into modern recognizable units: war, invasion, and pestilence; dynastic marriages and the dissolution of some; accidents of history; factors of climate and geography; the new bourgeoisie that found in the nation-state a favorable base of operations. The deeds of men wise or foolish, aggressive or docile, had their influence. Factors of language, tradition, dress, and custom, all affected the results. Some were more important in one place than in another. But these are some of the things that went into that crucible where nations were made. Eventually the modern world of nation-states took shape.

Then something went wrong. A movement that started out to be idealistic and humanizing, became distorted in some places into something quite different. New and ominous troubles loomed for mankind.

History, we know, does not move uniformly on a common front, even in the most regimented society. While in some countries nationalism continued to be a liberating influence, elsewhere it became a threat to freedom. The nationalist ideals of the American and French Revolutions were still widely quoted. But in some areas, nationalism became tinged with racial and national superiority and was even nurtured into a philosophy that could justify external aggression.

Intellectuals, from whose ranks had come the great formulators of noble ideals, were called upon to construct theories of racial and national supremacy. They were asked to devise a rationale that would fit the needs of ambitious countries. Thinkers and writers were not found wanting. They produced arguments to

bolster the national cause. They could cite "natural law," tradition, mystic forces of history, manifest destiny, and of course, God's will. Aggressive and aggrandizing nations called on God to expedite aims that were obviously irreconcilable.

Finally, the world saw nationalism under the Nazis of Germany: the terrifying spectacle of ignorance in action. This kind of nationalism had a destructive potential that had not been exposed before.

Increasingly in recent years, though not uniformly by any means, we have seen that as nationalism spreads, human liberty may recede. We have seen that some peoples, who were themselves oppressed, speedily became oppressors when the tools of nationhood were handed them. We have even seen that some ex-colonies, given their liberty, show a lusty appetite to acquire colonies.

These are just a few aspects of nationalism that make it a complex subject to teach.

The picture of nationalism varies so greatly from one country to the next, that the teacher utters generalizations at great risk. Nationalism must be studied almost on the basis of individual countries, rather than on the basis of general conceptions.

I have the comfortable role today of pointing out some of the paradoxes and difficulties in the subject of nationalism, without suggesting solutions. I leave the solving of the problems of nationalism to others, and merely look at the subject from the standpoint of the secondary school history teacher. It is a theme rich in learning possibilities.

One responsibility the teacher cannot escape: to lead his class from platitudes and familiar, comfortable generalization to see some of the subtleties in this topic. Merely to label nationalism as "good" or "bad" is superficial and meaningless. The subject requires exploration in depth.

How does a teacher convey subtleties to a group of youngsters? This has always been a problem. And teachers handle it according to their lights. A successful teacher, one who communicates with youngsters,

will organize the content on a basis that can be assimilated by boys and girls.

The immortal Henry Johnson said it many many years ago: "Easy" history, understandable history, is narrative and dramatic in treatment. It deals with personalities, with men in action. "Difficult" history deals with abstractions, with concepts and ideas. This was never more true than it is today.

The teacher who is trying to make the subject of nationalism meaningful to students must be sure he is in touch with his boys and girls, that the materials of learning are comprehensible. In some groups and with some pupils, nationalism will be studied essentially through the personalities involved. More able students should be expected to grapple with the issues and with implications that inhere in various courses of action.

Several examples of theoretical exploration are in order. One might be the frequent reference that nationalist leaders make to the Thirteen Colonies and the American Revolution. These men are often heard to say that if the American colonies could win their freedom, there is no reason why their own people can't. It is obviously true that there are analogies.

There are also some startling differences between the American colonies in the eighteenth century and countries seeking national independence today. The Thirteen Colonies were three thousand miles removed from the mother country. They had an unlimited area into which they could expand. They had huge potential resources, infinitely greater than those at the disposal of today's freedom-seeking countries. The Thirteen Colonies had had a century and a half of semi-independence in which to learn the techniques of statehood. These are a few of the differences that must be noted between the American colonies and the new or emerging nations of today.

Students can see why many of the older, more experienced nations look with tolerant dismay at the efforts of small areas to win national independence for themselves. The older nations find it hard to refute the arguments based on the American and French Revolutions. Yet they know that national statehood

may initiate more problems than it cures, that the passion of patriotism is no substitute for food.

Increasingly the older nations have been moving toward regional federation -- the European Community, for example -- to minimize the economic and social handicaps that accompany a multiplicity of small sovereign states.

It is evident that some new and some would-be nations are not economically viable. They lack the raw materials and other resources to assure their people a livelihood. They show poor prospects for providing the other essentials of statehood: a stable national life, firm frontiers, domestic peace, and civil guarantees for their people.

The emerging nations seem determined to clothe themselves in the expensive garments of sovereignty: an elaborate foreign service, a comprehensive military establishment. Some of them even want to leap a century or two and develop nuclear power. Though this may sound unrealistic, it corresponds to the facts as revealed in published assertions by leaders of some new nations.

There's another disquieting fact. Some new countries, as soon as they have acquired independence, have been the scene of internecine warfare based on religious or racial differences. The world has repeatedly seen the unhappy spectacle of civil war erupting as the old colonial power withdrew.

This is our dilemma. We don't want to thwart the national aspirations of any people. But we do have the right and the need to study the long-range prospects of any potential nation before we support its program of action. And we do have the obligation to ask where our own interests lie. We can favor no policy that will jeopardize the security of our own people.

Carried to its logical conclusion, nationalism can mean an accelerated Balkanization or fragmentation of nations. There is no reason why any segment of people, whether on a basis of race or religion or tradition shall not say "We want independence. We want

to be the Thirteen Colonies of 1960 (or 1961 or 1962). Our people demand sovereignty." If this process continues we shall see the further atomization of territories and nations.

There's another important factor we should keep in mind, one that is related to the question of war and peace. At the present time there are two nuclear powers of obviously great strength. These two nations maintain a kind of sensitive balance with respect to each other's nuclear might. The Soviet Union knows that if it should start a war, the United States, at no matter what cost, would destroy as much of the Soviet world as possible. And similarly the United States knows that if it should attack, retaliation by the Russians would be swift and deadly. Whatever other factors there might be to deter the Soviet Union and the United States from starting a nuclear war, this factor of deterrent balance must be remembered.

Yet some of the small countries and newer countries themselves aspire to become nuclear powers. And the day may come when some of them, at dreadful cost to their economies, will achieve nuclear production. If they syphon off enough of their resources, or borrow enough money, or are given enough money in grants, they can undoubtedly develop nuclear force. In the absence of binding international nuclear agreements, this means an extravagant duplication of effort and technical facilities. It may also mean an accelerated production of lethal by-products. Still another grim prospect is the increased chance of a nuclear accident that could trigger international war.

There are still other facets of nationalism with which history teachers must deal. One is the question of communism and nationalism. According to Karl Marx, nationalism is an evil thing. He saw it as a disintegrating force in the world, as a source of international competition and war. Marx projected a world of socialist states in which nationalist elements would be muted. Presumably Karl Marx's world would be a federation of cooperating socialist nations -- similar in organization, in their economy, in their aspirations, in their operation. Not nationalism, according to Marx, but internationalism, is the goal.

The Soviet Union, motherland of Communism, might have been expected to follow Marx's theory on nationalism. Paradoxically, though, one of the champions of nationalism -- under certain conditions -- is the Soviet Union. Any nation, though feudal and backward, may win the Soviet Union's encouragement and financial support if its policies can be made congruous with the needs of the Soviet Union.

In international forums the Russians have earned a reputation of sorts as defender of small nations, though this contradicts basic Marxist doctrine. But this concern for small nations is for export only. Nationalism inside the Soviet Union is another matter.

Call the roll of national peoples within the Soviet Union, peoples who in recent history have been sovereign or semi-sovereign. The Baltic States -- Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia -- are a good example. Or the Ukraine. Or the phenomenon called Birobidjan, the Soviet gift to world Jewry. Or the so-called autonomous republics of the Soviet Union. Or consider the states referred to as "satellites." By our measure of autonomy and independence these "nations" are grievously misnamed.

The Soviet Union's behavior toward its own national groups has been harsh and sometimes cruel. The story of the enforced movement of nationalities around the Soviet Union is still to be told. But it has been established that large-scale removals of people have been carried out in Poland, the Ukraine, Hungary, and the Baltic republics.

This action was justified by the government as punishment for disaffection and disloyalty. In cases of forced migration, the policy of the Soviet government has been to send country people into urban centers and urban people to agricultural areas -- to turn people into lost sheep. The true attitude of the Communist regimes toward nationalities was revealed in Russia's treatment of Hungary in 1956 and China's actions in Tibet in 1959.

There are still other intriguing examples of nationalism: two Koreas, two Germanys, two Chinas. These, too, reveal aspects of the subject that require

serious study.

Tough problems confront the United States in connection with surging nationalism. These problems have their place in the social studies classroom, even though some elements are so complex that they seem to defy solution.

What, for example, should be the policy of the United States toward Algeria? Instinctively many Americans think back to Revolutionary history and decide we should be on the side of colonial people who seek to cut the cord to the mother country. Yet we feel an allegiance toward France -- a historic one, a sentimental one, a relationship of power in today's world. And unfortunately, what sometimes appears to be the moral decision may be laden with danger to our own security. Students should look into these problems for which there are no easy answers.

It has been suggested that the United States should set up standards by which to estimate whether a nation is ready for statehood and then act accordingly. Any such policy is freighted with troubles, of course. Russia, for example, could enjoy an international field day while the United States' observers gathered their facts. Probably such a plan would win very limited support.

Americans are more likely to be impressed by the words of Tom Mboya, African labor leader. On a recent visit to the United States, Mboya made this statement on self-government for the Africans, "There are those who ask if the African is really ready to govern himself, and I submit that the African need not justify his right to self-determination and there is no one who has a moral right to ask such a question."

Many Americans believe this. We are not ready to submit to the UN the question of whether the original Thirteen Colonies were justified in seeking and winning independence from their mother country. In effect this is what Mr. Mboya is saying about the effort of tiny groups to seek national independence.

As far as we can see ahead we shall have such problems, probably in aggravated form. But unless

there is some counter movement we may eventually speak of a hundred-ten or a hundred-twenty nations. The multiplication of nations is surely not the answer to the great problems plaguing humanity today.

There is some international recognition that the nationalist movement had better be redirected, at least in certain controllable areas. There is evidence of a regional approach to some of the problems of the world. This is a cause for hope.

It may be that the British Commonwealth of Nations may suggest an answer; or the example of Benelux; or the Common Market; or certain elements in NATO or in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or in UN; or even international control and sharing of atomic power.

There are surely enough examples of international and regional cooperation to make possible something better than a continuing process of fragmentation of nations. It would perhaps be as sensible for New York City to take secession seriously -- an idea already put forward -- as it is for some of the new areas to try to become nations. Some experts think that New York City would be a fairly viable entity, one that could give its people a better measure of essential goods and services than some would-be nations.

The topic of the conference this week-end is Emerging Nationalism. We have seen that nationalism is no longer the hope of mankind and has, in some places, been the opposite. The need is for more order, not more nations.

I hope for your sake and mine that before long we may have a conference on Receding Nationalism.

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Fifty-sixth Annual Spring Meeting

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The New Jersey Council for the Social Studies

Trenton, New Jersey

May 8, 1959 -- Dinner Meeting

Chairman: Maud N. Austin, President, New Jersey Council for the Social Studies

Speaker: Dr. Leonard Kenworthy, Professor, Brooklyn College, Brooklyn, New York. "Meeting the Leaders of New Nations."

Recorder: Mary Joan Doyle, Macfarland Junior High School, Washington, D. C.

May 9, 1959 -- General Session

Chairman: Elisabeth A. Kelley, Social Studies, Red Bank High School, New Jersey.

Speaker: Dr. Eric Goldman, Professor of History, Princeton University. "America's Reaction to Emerging Nationalism."

Recorder: Joseph Hillyard, Supervisor of Social Studies, Baltimore County, Maryland.

Elementary Section

Chairman: Wilifred L. Wright, Rockville Centre Public Schools, Rockville Centre, New York

Speaker: Evelyn Girardin, Principal, Montebello School, Baltimore, Maryland. "Developing World Understanding in the Classroom."

Recorder: Helen Addison, Visiting Instruction Corps, Washington, D. C.

Secondary Section

Chairman: Dr. Eunice I. Johns, Director of Social Studies, Wilmington Public Schools, Wilmington, Delaware.

Speaker: Dr. David E. Weingast, Principal of Central Evening High School, Newark, New Jersey. "Nationalism: Issues and Problems on the Secondary Level."

Recorder: Mrs. Lenore Townsend, Ocean City High School, Ocean City, New Jersey.

College Section

Chairman: Dr. John Niemeyer, President, Bank Street College of Education, New York City.

Speaker: Dr. Abdul Said, Professor, School of International Service, The American University, Washington, D. C. "Nationalism: Issues and Problems on the College Level."

Recorder: Daniel J. Showan, Abington Senior High School, Abington, Pennsylvania

Luncheon Meeting

Chairman: Edna Carter, Supervisor of Social Studies, Baltimore City, Maryland.

Speaker: Dr. Frances R. Fussell, Lecturer on International Affairs, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania. "The Current International Situation."

Recorder: Mrs. Frederick L. Zoeller, Malverne High School, Malverne, New York.

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